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Abstract
Information integration theory suggests that differences in the 
moral judgments of children and adults is an example of a 
developmental process of information integration where younger 
children employ a unidimensional integration rule, and older children 
and adults employ multidimensional integration rules. Studies that 
utilize the information integration approach involve single-episode 
stories in which two or three levels of intention and consequence 
story cues are manipulated in a within-subjects factorial design.
The present study manipulated two sources of information about 
the story protagonist, as well as information about his intentions 
and the consequences. The four variables manipulated were:
(a) personal goodness of the story protagonist (good and bad);
(b) age of the story protagonist (8 years and 12 years);
(c) intentions of the story protagonist (accidental, 
mischievous, or malicious); and (d) the consequences of the 
protagonists' actions (no injury, small bruise, or bloody 
nose). Sixty subjects, (20 third graders, 20 sixth graders, 
and 20 adults) were each asked to judge the actions of a boy in 
36 different stories and make a punishment response on a 
nine-point scale. Each subject received two randomly ordered 
replications over two, one hour testing sessions one week apart. 
Results from the group ANOVA indicated that subjects integrated 
the four stimulus variables when making moral judgments. There 
was also a developmental shift in the salience of the different
ix
levels of personal goodness, intentions and consequences on the 
punishment responses of the three age groups. Individual subject 
analyses revealed a wide range of individual differences in the 
integration rules used by subjects of each age group. Third 
graders demonstrated less consistency in the story cues they 
utilized in making their punishment responses, sixth graders 
generally focused on consequence information and the majority 
of adults combined intention and consequence information 
when making their punishment responses. These findings suggest 
that even though subjects in all age groups have the capacity 
to integrate multiple dimensions of information, there is a 
developmental shift which involves a selective integration process 
governing how subjects of different ages determine the salience 
of information when making punishment judgments.
x
Moral Evaluation: An Investigation
of Developmental Patterns in 
the Use of Cognitive Algebra
Moral evaluation research has for the most part concentrated 
on the empirical specification of parameters associated with the 
hypothesized developmental shift from objective to subjective 
realism in young children (Piaget, 1932). The traditional 
paradigm used by researchers has been to present subjects with two 
verbal stories that vary in the degree of outcome damage, as well 
as, the intentions of the actor. Subjects are asked to judge the 
conduct of the actors and determine which one is the naughtiest. 
Despite the fact that the developmental pattern initially observed 
by Piaget is sensitive to a number of contextual cues, the majority 
of reported research to date remains theoretically aligned with 
Piaget's conclusion that young children rely on either objective 
or subjective story information but never an integration of the 
two when making moral judgments. Thus, for most researchers the 
major question of interest is the determination of age parameters 
associated with an observable difference in children's reasoning 
about moral conduct.
Dissatisfied with this phenomenological approach, an 
increasing number of investigators in the last five to ten years 
have undertaken different approaches to study the moral evaluations 
of young children. Recent studies have utilized a functional
2measurement approach to study stimulus integration (Anderson,
1980), and/or used the single episode story-grammar framework of 
Stein & Glenn (1979) to obtain more consistent stimulus materials. 
Results from these investigations suggest that the majority of 
findings from previous studies using neo-Piagetian research designs 
are confounded by inconsistent methodologies and poor selection of 
stimulus variables. Instead of children relying on either 
intention or consequence information, they integrate both types 
of information (e.g., Surber, 1977; Leon, 1980; and Grueneich, 
1982b). Thus, current researchers have focused their interest on 
investigating how children incorporate multiple sources of 
information when evaluating moral conduct.
In addressing this question and the rationale for the proposed 
investigation, the present paper will briefly review Piaget's 
original observations and theoretical interpretations of his 
results. Then the major substantive findings of research conducted 
in the neo-Piagetian tradition will be reviewed. Previous critical 
reviews of this research will be explicated, emphasizing the role 
of extended story-grammar analysis in existing research and how 
incorporation of this procedure in future investigations will 
enhance the precision of findings. The final section of this 
review will critique recent applications of the functional 
measurement approach of information-integration theory in the area 
of moral evaluation research. Generalizations from the reported 
research will be identified, as well as, how further specification
3of the model can be useful in investigating the interaction of a 
number of factors which possibly mediate the decision process 
children employ when making moral evaluations.
Piagetian Theory and Research
After Piaget published his observations on the moral reasoning 
of young children, a plethora of data has been amassed as 
investigators attempt to specify how young children reason and 
evaluate moral conduct. Implicit throughout The Moral Judgment of 
the Child (Piaget, 1948) is the basic assumption that human beings 
develop a mature concept of morality. The specific concept of 
morality espoused by Piaget is based on two core assumptions:
"(1) respect for the rules of the social order, and (2) a sense of 
justice as a concept of the rights of persons that stem from 
considerations of equality, social contract, and reciprocity in 
human relations" (Lickona, 1976 p. 219).
The development of a "mature morality" is a stage-like process 
involving two discrete levels of reasoning. Piaget labeled these 
distinct reasoning styles as (a) heteronomous morality where the 
young child bases moral judgments on the objective consequence of 
a transgression; and (b) morality of cooperation where the morally 
mature child bases moral judgments on the intentions or subjective 
factors associated with the transgression. This conceptualization 
of moral development is consistent with much of Piaget's theorizing 
about non-social cognitive development. By invoking the notion of 
egocentrism, Piaget characterizes the young morally immature child
4as, "confusing the internal with the external, the self with the 
non-self, and mental or psychological phenomena with physical 
events" (Turiel, 1983 p. 137).
Thus, for the young child the rules and laws which regulate 
social behavior are as fixed as the rules which govern the action 
of physical objects. A basic assumption of the young child is 
that morality is a universalistic phenomena emanating from forces 
extrinsic to the self (e.g., morality is equal to authority). 
Ultimately, development toward a mature morality results in an 
intrinsic orientation involving rights and principles of justice 
as the basis for reciprocity in human social interactions.
The empirical basis of Piaget's theory is a series of 
interviews with 120 six- to ten-year-old, lower class, Swiss school 
children. The interviews involved children's responses to 
verbally presented story pairs which varied degree of intention 
and consequence information across three story types— clumsiness, 
stealing, and lying. Evaluations of the type of moral reasoning 
children used in judging the conduct of the story actors is based 
on two simple questions; (a) are the children equally guilty? and
(b) which of the two is the naughtiest, and why? Results from 
Piaget's inquiries indicate that younger children (six to seven 
years) attend to the magnitude of the consequences which occur in 
the story-pairs they are asked to judge. However, children 
older than seven years increasingly take the subjective intent of 
the actor into account when judging naughtiness. Summaries of
Piaget's work (e.g., Flavell, 1963, Ginsberg & Opper, 1969, Rest, 
1983) generally focus on the following findings: (a) younger
children tend to regard acts with the most serious objective 
consequences as the most immoral; (b) older children incorporate 
subjective intent into their judgments of wrongdoings; (c) the two 
classes of retributive justice which children use are initially 
expiatory punishment and ultimately punishment by reciprocity; 
and (d) younger children tend to use "imminent justice" as a 
realistic method of retribution.
Noteworthy by its general absence from most critical reviews 
and summaries of Piaget's theory is his repeated acknowledgement 
of the limitations inherent in his method. Specifically he cautions 
the reader about what one is measuring and how it is measured.
Piaget clearly states, what he is and is not measuring, "not the 
child's actual decisions, nor even his memory of his actions, but 
the way he evaluates a given piece of conduct" (Piaget, 1948, p.
108). Piaget goes on to indicate he is not actually measuring 
moral reasoning per se, but "verbal knowledge and verbal judgment" 
in young children (see Piaget, 1948 p. 109).
Generalizations one can make from the data are rather limited 
given the numerous constraints Piaget invokes when discussing his 
results. Piaget cites numerous instances of children at all ages 
using both types of reasoning, but stresses that by age seven the 
majority of most children's evaluations are based on intention 
information. Yet, the notion of a true stage-wise progression in
moral reasoning is not supported; instead Piaget espouses the 
notion that two distinct reasoning processes are present in 
school-aged children::
We can at least venture to submit that even if the 
objective and subjective conceptions of responsibility 
are not, properly speaking, features of two successive 
stages, they do at least define two distinct processes, 
one of which on the average precedes the other in the 
moral development of the child, although the two 
partially synchronize (Piaget, 1948 p. 120).
Finally, the reader is cautioned by Piaget of the potential 
problem which may result from interpreting "vilain" as 
"naughty": While in most of the interrogatories we have
translated "vilain" by "naughty", the reader should note that 
the English word has an exclusively authoritative ring which 
the French has not. Children can only be naughty in 
reference to grown-ups. Indeed, the word is so powerful 
a weapon in the hands of adult constraint in this country 
that its use in any verbal experiments made on English 
children would probably give appreciably different 
results from those based on the word "vilain" (Piaget,
1948 p. 111).
Neo-Piagetian Research
Piaget's preliminary investigations of moral reasoning by
7children is quite remarkable because it has stimulated over 100 
published studies which have attempted to either replicate his 
initial results or to identify at what age children do use intention 
information in making moral judgments (e.g., Keasey, 1978; Rest, 
1983).
Reviews by Lickona (1976), Karniol (1978), and Keasey (1978) 
cite over 60 studies which vary in methodology, stimulus presentation 
and stimulus materials, but which support Piaget's central finding 
that as children grow older they become increasingly more reliant 
on subjective information when evaluating the conduct of story 
characters. A number of studies cited in Lickona (1976),
Karniol (1978), and Keasey (1978), involve cross cultural research 
in Great Britain, Belgium, the United States, Taiwan, and Israel, as 
well as studies using different social classes (e.g., Boehm, 1962; 
Boehm and Nash, 1962; Medinnus, 1962; Krebs, 1965; Havighurst and 
Neugarten, 1967; Lickona, 1967, 1971; Armsby, 1971). These studies 
provide additional support for the robustness of the objective 
subjective shift in reasoning.
Replication studies (Boehm, 1962; Boehm and Nash, 1962;
Whiteman and Kasier, 1969) support the overall finding of increased 
subjective reasoning with age. Combined data from Boehm (1962) 
and Boehm and Nash (1962) illustrate the magnitude of the shift 
toward subjective reasoning in the evaluation of story pairs by 
children between six and eleven years of age. At six years, 35% 
rely on subjective information, at seven, 49%; at eight, 54%; at
8nine, 84%; at ten, 77% and at eleven, 71%. However, note the 
discrepancy between this data and Piaget's finding of 100% 
subjective reasoning in children older than ten years and his 
caution regarding research with English speaking children using 
an evaluation of "naughtiness".
Examples of the specificity of the interplay between intention, 
outcome, and the developmental pattern toward increased reliance 
on intentions is further explicated by Krebs (1965). Using picture 
stories instead of verbal stories he found three substages: (a)
recognizing intentions when consequences are equal, (b) recognizing 
intentions when consequences are weighed against them, and
(c) recognizing that intentions can make an act with bad consequences 
good. Evidence from several studies by Lickona (1971, 1973) also 
supports the shift toward increasing reliance on intentionality cues, 
but within a hierarchy of story type. He found that reliance on 
intentionality cues in stories involving lying preceeds the use of 
intentionality in stories involving clumsiness.
Both Keasey (1978) and Karniol (1978) have reviewed the moral 
evaluation literature by grouping studies in relation to common 
methodologies, stimulus materials, and principle research questions. 
Karniol reviewed over 30 studies which have attempted to evaluate 
children's use of intention cues when making moral evaluations. 
Unfortunately, she found only two studies, (Rule and Duker, 1973; 
Weiner and Peter, 1973) that unambiguously demonstrate that the 
value of an intended act is a crucial factor in children's
9evaluations.
Keasey (1978) separated modifications of Piaget's original 
methodology into eight categories of research: (a) studies that
evaluated all four basic story types; good intentions/high damage, 
good intentions/low damage, bad intentions/high damage, bad intentions/ 
low damage (e.g., Buchanan and Thompson, 1973; Constanzo, Coie,
Grumet, and Farnill, 1973; Hebble, 1971; Imamoglo, 1975); (b) 
studies using single story episodes as well as story pairs (e.g., 
Berg-Cross, 1975); (c) studies that increased the range of 
consequences from two levels to four levels (e.g., Armsby, 1971);
(d) studies involving damage to human beings or physical objects 
(e.g., Berg-Cross, 1975; Imamoglo, 1975); (e) studies using multiple 
modes of presentation such as video tape, film, and/or verbal 
presentations (e.g., Chandler Greenspan and Barenboim, 1973;
Collins, 1974; Dorr & Frey, 1974; Farnill, 1974; and King, 1971);
(f) studies which varied order of presentation of intention and 
consequence cues (e.g., Nummedal & Bass, 1976); (g) studies which 
varied story outcome in relation to self versus other's consequences 
(e.g., Nummendal & Bass, 1976; Keasey, 1977); and (h) studies which 
explicitly specify the intentional versus accidental distinction 
in the story pairs (e.g., Armsby, 1971; Buchanan & Thompson, 1973; 
Farnill, 1974).
The conclusions drawn from this potpourri of methodologies 
and various stimulus materials is of course limited by confounded 
data within the studies as well as an unwillingness to generalize
10
across such disparate research strategies. However, certain 
trends which consistently emerge suggest that the varying degree 
in which children between six and ten years base moral evaluations 
on intentionality or some type of subjective reasoning is 
differentially affected by a number of story characteristics: (a)
order of presentation; (b) stimulus mode; (c) explicitness of the 
intention cue and (d) different aspects of the consequence cue.
Although demonstrating the effects of numerous stimuli on the 
moral reasoning of children, researchers using modified Piagetian 
story protocols have failed to provide solid empirical evidence 
for the underlying developmental processes which are involved in 
children's reasoning styles. Hypothesized processes have involved 
the salience of social rules, (e.g., Piaget, 1948; Flavell, 1963; 
Karniol, 1978), social role modeling, (Bandura & McDonald, 1963, 
Constanzo et al., 1973, Chandler, 1978), and conservation ability 
(Sternlieb and Youniss, 1975).
Summary of Piagetian-based Research
Attempts at replicating Piaget's findings regarding the moral 
reasoning of children between six and ten years of age have been 
successful. Children do exhibit an increasing reliance on subjective 
information in stories when evaluating the conduct of story actors. 
Piaget's caution regarding the differential effect of what and 
how we ask children to evaluate conduct in making moral judgments 
has been realized. Whether children evaluate story pairs, or 
single stories, whether they are asked to evaluate naughtiness, 
amount of positive or negative effort, or the amount an actor
11
should be punished all seem to affect the type of reasoning employed.
Piaget's claim that objective and subjective reasoning represents 
two distinct processes or modes of reasoning has not been validated. 
Investigations which have sought to specify the effects of various 
stimulus combinations on children's moral reasoning have failed 
to satisfactorily demonstrate why these stimuli interact across 
age groups. Hence, neither critical cognitive processes underlying 
developmental aspects of moral reasoning, nor reliable methodologies 
allowing for a clear specification of the effects of different 
aspects of story stimuli have been obtained from research using Piaget's 
basic paradigm.
Cognitive Processing Approaches to Moral Evaluation
As discussed above, post-Piagetian research has established 
that a complex array of factors are associated with the reasoning 
a child employs when evaluating conduct. Yet, the theoretical 
implications are unclear. Complex interactions do exist among 
stimulus variables, but what do these empirical relations tell 
us about reasoning processes in young children?
Studies by Grueneich and Trabasso (1981) and Stein and Trabasso 
(1981) are representative of recent attempts to address this 
question. These investigators have pursued Keasey's criticism of 
the literature regarding the unsystemmatic use of motive and/or 
intent information presented to children in a story framework.
Utilizing the story-grammar of Stein & Glenn (1979), Grueneich & 
Trabasso reviewed the moral evaluation literature to ascertain the
12
relation between the event structure of the story format and 
how variation of intent, motive and consequence information 
influence moral judgments. Although a comprehensive discussion of 
story grammar is available in Stein & Glenn (1979), the 
single-episode prototype story grammar structure discussed below 
is typical of stories used in the moral evaluation literature.
Stein & Glenn's story grammar has two major components; 
categories of information, and logical relations. The basic 
structure of the single-episode consists of six main categories, 
plus the logical relations that connect them. This structure is 
presented in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Briefly, the six story categories are: (a) the setting; (b) the 
initiating event; (c) the internal response; (d) the attempt; (e) 
the direct consequence; and (f) the reaction. Technically, a 
well-formed story contains all six categories of information. In 
most of the stories used in moral evaluation research, only four 
categories are present; the setting, initiating event, the attempt 
and the direct consequence. Information which is usually explicitly 
stated in the "internal response" and "reaction" categories can be 
inferred from information contained in the other four categories.
As an illustration, Grueneich and Trabasso provide several 
examples of well and poorly-formed stories. Typically moral
13
evaluation stories vary the explicitness of the story category 
information to investigate the subject's ability to infer motive 
and intention cues from story information. Examples of stories 
which vary in the explicitness of story information are provided 
below.
Example 1 —  explicit story category information:
Jotui was very mad at one of his friends.
He saw his friend coming. He picked up 
a rock and threw it at his friend. The 
rock hit John's friend on the leg and 
made a bruise (Leon, 1980).
Example 2 —  implicit information regarding intention and 
motive of protagonist:
Mike and a friend were throwing rocks 
against a wall. Mike threw a rock against 
the wall. The rock bounced back toward 
Mike's friend. The rock hit Mike's 
friend on the leg and made a bruise (Leon, 
1980).
Example 3 —  The logical relation between story category 
information is inconsistent:
Chris wanted to help his mom. Chris 
broke all the eggs in the refrigerator. 
Chris finished in time for supper 
(Warren, Nicholas & Trabasso, 1979).
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It is evident in the above examples, that when intention cues 
become less explicit and/or less consistent with the other story 
information, it becomes more difficult to make inferences about 
the intentions of the protagonist. Grueneich and Trabasso1s review 
of studies using verbally presented stories and/or filmed story 
sequences (e.g., Chandler, et al, 1973; Bearison and Issacs, 1975; 
Berndt and Berndt, 1975; Asp, Johnson, and Trabasso, 1979) all 
indicate that most of the stimulus material used in moral judgment 
research is poorly formed. Studies which contrast the mode of 
stimulus presentation don't control for the amount of information 
explicitly and implicitly conveyed in each story format. Stories 
which use the traditional story pair format (Piaget, 1948) often 
do not include logical connections between story categories, or are 
stated so poorly that a high degree of unintended ambiguity exists 
between the protagonist's intentions (goals) and his/her actions.
Given the general absence of adequate stimulus materials in 
the moral evaluation literature, Grueneich and Trabasso suggest a 
number of strategies researchers can use to address this problem:
(a) reports in the literature should either provide detailed 
descriptions of the stimulus materials used or advise 
the reader of their availability;
(b) standardization of stories across studies should be 
attempted because a major source of variation among 
the reported research results appear to be due
15
to the inconsistencies in story structure and content.
(c) consistent use of extended story-grammar analysis should 
be employed when constructing stimulus materials.
The specific advantages of the last recommendation is that 
explicit analysis of story stimuli can assure the researcher that 
story materials contain the information intended, facilitate 
stimulus manipulations which could affect moral evaluations, or 
identify certain types of previously unnoticed story information 
which could be affecting the moral judgments made by the subjects.
That is, it is likely that intention or goal information can be 
inferred from the action statements or consequence data presented 
in the story. Stein and Trabasso suspected that this was plausible 
because other research investigating how children process story 
information indicated that goals and consequences form part of a 
causal chain. To test this hypothesis, these researchers presented 
five- to six-year-old, and eight- to nine-year-old children with story 
information in one of two conditions.
In the control condition, subjects evaluated the moral conduct 
of the protagonist in three different stories involving an underlying 
theme of lying, personal injury, or stealing. Each story was 
constructed to consist of two statements for each of Stein &
Glenn's (1979) six story categories. In each story negative motives 
(intentions) could be inferred from the actions of the story 
protagonist. In the experimental condition the story consisted 
of the twelve statements used in the control condition plus two
16
additional statements which were placed in one of five different 
story categories. In each case the statements were semantically 
equivalent and were reworded to be consistent with the story 
category where they were placed. The content of the two additional 
statements contained information which would allow the listener to 
infer the internal goal the protagonist had for engaging in the 
action sequence described in the story. The experimental manipulation 
involved five different conditions where the additional positive 
goal statements were placed in either the setting, initiating 
event, internal response, consequence or reaction categories. As 
an example of the type of manipulation employed, both the control 
and experimental conditions for the story involving a "lying" 
theme are presented in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Results indicated that a significant number of kindergarten 
and third-grade children used story information from five different 
category sources in a single story framework to make moral evaluations. 
This result calls into question the principle focus of previous 
work which dichotomized moral evaluations as based solely on 
either intentions or consequence information. Stein and Trabasso 
suggest that an evolving ability to integrate information develops 
in young children rather than a single discrete developmental 
shift from objective reasoning to subjective reasoning. They
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conclude: "What seems to be developing is a more sophisticated 
knowledge structure of initiating events, goals, plans, attempts, 
and consequences that children use to make inferences and evaluations" 
(Stein and Trabasso, 1981, p.173)
Thus, the research reported by Stein and Trabasso is significant 
because it empirically demonstrates that children use information 
from a number of story categories to make moral evaluations.
Studies of Neumendal and Bass (1978) and Grueneich (1982b), Surber 
(1982) and Constanzo et al., (1973) have indicated order effects 
when the order of intention and consequence information is varied 
in a story framework. The present findings fail to indicate that 
order of stimulus presentation effects were salient because children 
in both age groups used the additional intention information 
equally well from the setting, initiating event, internal response, 
consequence, and reaction, story categories.
Although the research discussed by Stein and Trabasso does make 
a significant contribution to the study of moral evaluation, there 
are a number of limitations which require further discussion. The 
design of the study deviated from previous moral evaluation research 
by including in the experimental condition only very explicitly 
stated positive intentions of the protagonist. The results tell 
us nothing about how children use less explicit or mixed positive 
and negative story information from several story categories. In 
addition, because a between-subjects design was used, each 
presentation of the experimental condition involving a different
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story category used a different sample of subjects. It is not 
clear whether the same results would have been obtained, if the 
same children had been exposed to all five story conditions in a 
within-subjects design.
In summary, the application of story grammar frameworks as a 
method for critiquing existing research or for designing new 
studies appears to be a useful technique. The review of research 
by Grueneich and Trabasso (1981) underscores the lack of consistent 
methodologies and the abundant use of poorly constructed stimulus 
materials. Moreover, results from a study by Stein and Trabasso
(1981) suggest that a number of process variables heretofore 
ignored by researchers could contribute significantly to how 
children reason about moral conduct. In the next section, the 
application of information integration theory as an approach for 
assessing the salience of different aspects of story information 
to young children is examined.
Information-integration theory and research
As discussed earlier, Piaget observed young children using 
both intention and outcome information in their discussions of 
moral conduct. In spite of this observation, he concluded from 
his research that younger children relied exclusively on objective 
story information and later shifted toward reliance on subjective 
story information. Piaget never suggested that children are 
ignorant of either type of information, just that their judgments 
are based on either one type or the other, but never on an
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integration of the two types of information. "Up to age 10, two 
types of answers exist side by side. In one type actions are 
evaluated in terms of the material result and independently of 
motives; according to the other type of answer motives alone are 
what counts" (Piaget 1932/1965 pp. 123-124).
Several investigators (Hebble, 1971; Buchannan & Thompson 
1973; and Constanzo et al., 1973) have attempted to examine how 
children process and integrate story information but have not been
able to rule out Piaget's centration hypothesis as a reasonable,
although competing explanation. The reason for this is that in all
of these studies the investigators analyzed the data in relation
to the mean rating scores of all children in the same experimental 
condition. These analyses do not take into account the individual 
scores which the centration hypothesis would predict. The 
alternative is to analyze individual subject scores to determine 
if each subject is concentrating on just one dimension of the 
story or is integrating information from a number of sources in 
the story.
By employing the information integration approach (Anderson, 
1974a, 1974b, 1974c, 1981) researchers have begun to design moral 
evaluation studies to examine the concept of stimulus integration 
and to determine the algebraic structure of integration rules 
employed by subjects of different ages (Lane & Anderson, 1976,
Leon, 1980, 1982, 1984; Surber, 1977, 1982; Grueneich, 1982b).
Before discussing specific applications of the
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information integration approach, the theory, its underlying 
assumptions, and its adequacy as a heuristic for studying 
psychological development will be reviewed. Information-integration 
theory (Anderson, 1981) addresses long-standing methodological 
problems associated with simultaneously studying multiple causes of 
behavior. Although it is a generally assumed truism that all behavior 
is determined by multiple forces, analysis of how the psychological 
valence of stimuli are integrated has required a quantitative theory 
of stimulus integration. Anderson (1980) describes an elegantly simple 
approach to stimulus integration and how it provides a means for 
measuring the subjective psychological values of stimuli.
The basic idea of information integration theory discussed 
below is illustrated in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Physical stimuli impinging on the organism are processed by 
the valuation function (V). These psychological representations 
Sp S£ . • • . are combined by the integration function (I) 
into an implicit covert response (r). The covert response (r), is 
transformed by the output or judgment function into the overt 
observed response (R). Basic operations involved are: (a) the 
psychological valuation of physical stimuli; (b) the integration of 
psychological representations of the physical stimuli; and (c) the 
response or judgment function (M), which mediates between the 
covert response and the overt response specified by the investigator.
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As Anderson indicates, two of the three conceptually distinct 
functions are associated with measurement; V with stimulus measurement, 
and M with response measurement. However, it is the third function 
I that is central to the theory. Because the integration function 
cannot be directly observed, a basic assumption made by the theory 
is that the response function (M) is linear. In addition, Anderson 
notes that rating methods have typically been criticized by 
measurement theorists because they are often confounded by a number 
of biases. However, Anderson has demonstrated that by taking a few 
precautions one can eliminate biases associated with rating scales 
(see Anderson, 1974a, p. 231; Anderson, 1976c, p. 245.) The 
precautions outlined by Anderson are: (a) establishing a frame of 
reference to rate stimuli against; (b) establishing end-anchor points 
that are just noticeably more extreme than the stimuli' to be 
judged; this precaution empirically defines the stimulus range prior to 
presenting any of the experimental stimuli; and (c) use of a graphical 
or numerical scale with enough steps to avoid end point responses. 
Anderson reports that seven step scales are too limited with 
children between five and seven years of age. Instead Anderson and 
his colleagues use a 19 point scale of \ cm. white circles.
Surber (1984) recently reviewed the use of quantitative 
judgments and rating scales in developmental research. She suggested 
that developmental shifts proposed by Piaget (1965) regarding the 
amount of information children use and the manner in which they 
use it can best be investigated with mathematical models of judgment.
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These models test the way information is combined (integrated) by 
subjects, and can describe both quantitative and qualitative 
developmental changes. As Surber points out, mathematical models 
of judgment processes enhance our understanding of development by 
improving the precision of our descriptive statements about 
developmental change.
Quantitative change is associated with changes in the parameter 
values of the model, and qualitative change is evident in changes 
in the form of equations which support the data. Hence as Surber 
states, "With their precise descriptive potential, algebraic 
models can fulfill one of the important functions of theory in 
science— specifically, to unify and render understandable a set of 
phenomena that would otherwise be a miscellaneous collection of 
empirical relations"(Surber, 1984, p. 228).
In addition, Surber indicated that mathematical judgment models 
(e.g., information integration models) allow investigators to 
manipulate variables hypothesized to be associated with developmental 
change and measure their effect in relation to predictions suggested 
by the model. Examples of the application of information integration 
theory can be found in a number of areas associated with developmental
r
changes. In addition to studies investigating moral judgment, Surber 
(1984) cites investigators who have studied equity judgments (Anderson & 
Butzin, 1978), achievement judgments and attributions (Gupta & Singh, 
1980; Kun, Parsons & Ruble, 1974; Surber, 1980), quantity judgments
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(Anderson and Cuneo, 1978a, Cuneo, 1980, 1982; Leon, 1982b; Verge 
& Bogartz, 1978); as well as evaluations of likeableness of playmates 
and toys (Butzin and Anderson, 1973; Henrick, Franz & Hoving,
1975; Singh, Sidana, & Saluja, 1978). Of central importance to 
the present paper are the information integration studies designed 
to investigate the processes underlying children's moral evaluations.
As discussed earlier, post-Piagetian type investigations of 
moral judgment have concentrated on identifying the earliest age 
associated with a shift from consequence-based to intention-based 
reasoning, as well as the varying context in which this hypothesized 
developmental shift occurs. In contrast, the information 
integration studies conducted by Grueneich (1982b), Leon (1980,
1982, 1984), and Surber (1977, 1982) examined how children integrate 
multidimensional sources of information when making moral judgments. 
These studies extend the early factorial studies (e.g., Hebble,
1971, Constanzo et al.; 1973; Buchanan & Thompson, 1973) which were 
designed to examine when children first use intent information and 
how this is associated with different levels of positive and 
negative intent and consequence information. All of these studies 
provide empirical support for the hypothesis that children do use 
intent and consequence information when making moral evaluations. 
However, it is only the more recent work of Grueneich, Leon, and 
Surber that systematically investigated childrens' use of information 
integration rules when making moral evaluations.
Surber (1977) conducted the first study designed to specify
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the integration processes used by children in making moral evaluations. 
This study investigated the applicability of the model as a method 
for studying moral judgment processes in young children as well as 
provided a test of which linear model of information integration 
(averaging or additive) is most representative of the processing 
children use when making moral evaluations. The averaging model 
predicts that a subject's response to a given stimulus combination 
is the weighted average of the stimulus values, while the additive 
model predicts that stimulus values are simply added together to 
form a unitary judgment or response. The averaging rule for 
intention and consequence stories is:
Y i j  = (wj sn  + wc sc. + wQ s0)/(Wl + sc + wQ)
whereas the additive rule is:
Y i j  = »! SU  + «c Scj + »„ s0
Yij is the psychological impression of the ith intention and the 
jth consequence. In the equation, Wj and w^, are the weights which 
represent the psychological importance of intentions and consequences 
for the moral evaluation. Moreover, s^^ and s^ are the scale 
values of the ith and jth intention and consequence, and Wq Sq 
represents the initial impression or bias of the subject when no other 
information is available. Both models are based on the same three 
assumptions for linear integration rules: (a) Wj and w^, remain constant
over all levels of Sj and s^,, (b) the scale values of s^ and s^ are
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independent of the combinations in which they occur, and (c) the 
subject's response R„ is linearly related to"Yij. As a result, 
data supporting either type of the linear information integration 
model should plot as a set of parallel curves, with the interaction 
term in the analysis of variance being nonsignificant.
Using Piagetian type stories Surber interviewed kindergarten, 
second-, and fifth-grade children, and college students. The application 
of the information integration approach required that three 
levels of intentions and three levels of consequence information 
be factorially combined so that each child would judge all different 
story combinations. In addition, to test the averaging as opposed to the 
additive integration rules, three intention only and three consequence only 
stories were judged.
Results revealed main effects for intentions, consequences, 
and age. The age effect appeared to be a function of the college 
student ratings being generally less punitive than the children's 
ratings. The absence of significant interactions between intention 
and consequences supports a linear type integration model (averaging 
or additive) as the integration rule used by all age groups.
Moreover, the steeper slope of the data curve representing responses 
to the intention only condition is consistent with an averaging 
rule and not with an additive rule of information integration.
Surber's (1982) study is a methodological extension of her 
earlier work. Although the first investigation provides support for a 
multidimensional intention and consequence processing model of
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moral evaluation, it failed to unequivocally rule out order of 
stimulus presentation or unidimensional processing as alternative 
explanations for the results (e.g., Feldman et al., 1976; Nummedal 
and Bass, 1976; Grueneich, 1982b). Building on her earlier work, 
Surber employed a similar methodology and experimental design.
She presented 31 kindergarteners, 26 second graders, and 30 
fifth graders with different stories about a five-year-old girl. 
Stimulus variables included three levels of intention information 
ranging from unambiguously positive to negative, and three levels 
of consequence information ranging from neutral to negative, 
counter-balanced for order of presentation. Surber also 
presented subjects with stories which consisted of intention only 
information or consequence only information. Over a series of two 
30-minute sessions, each child evaluated the conduct of the story 
protagonist in all 42 stories after demonstrating verbatim memory 
of the story information. Surber's design, although somewhat 
complicated, allowed for the measurement of the independent 
effects of qualitatively different stimulus dimensions as well as 
the absolute effects of order of presentation. Therefore, the 
effects of both the structure and the content of the story information 
were evaluated.
Results from the study indicated that the effect of intention 
information on children's judgments increases with age, while the 
effect of consequence information decreases. This replicates the
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findings of Surber (1977). Moreover, both intention and consequence 
information were subject to a recency effect. Though all children 
accurately recalled all story information, the stimulus dimension 
presented last always received the greatest weight. The centration 
hypothesis predicts, a bimodal distribution of main effects for each 
variable as well as negative correlations between the means for the 
main effects. Results from these analyses did not indicate 
either a bimodal distribution nor significant negative correlations 
among the main effects for any of the age groups. Thus, although the 
data strongly supports an information integration model of moral 
evaluation, there is also a developmental progression in the 
psychological weight children attach to intention and consequence 
cues irrespective of order of presentation. Intention cues are 
given significantly more weight in the moral evaluation made by 
fifth graders, while consequence information is emphasized more by 
kindergarteners. The combined results from the two Surber 
studies indicate that children between the ages of five and eleven 
understand that intentions and consequences are qualitatively 
different pieces of information irrespective of the order of 
stimulus presentation. In addition, the order in which intention 
and consequence information is presented appears to increase the 
valence of the most recently presented piece of story information. 
This recency effect which occurred in all three age groups does 
not appear to be a verbatim memory effect, or to be strong enough
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to negate multidimensional processing of story information used 
by the children in making moral evaluations of conduct.
In another series of information integration studies Leon 
(1980) conducted a comprehensive investigation of children's use 
of intent and consequence information in making moral judgments.
Leon assumed that children were competent "information integrators", 
and designed a study which would empirically identify the type of 
integration rules children used. By varying the levels of explicit 
or implicit story information, as well as, correcting inherent 
weaknesses in the Piagetian choice-task story design, Leon was 
able to develop a rigourous test of the information integration 
approach. Leon tested eight male and eight female children at 
five different grades: first, second, third, fifth and seventh, 
as well as, 24 college students. The experimental procedure 
involved a four phase process for both "simple" stories with 
explicitly stated intention information, and standard stories with 
implicit intention information which was conveyed by varying the manner 
of aggression engaged in by the story protagonist.
The initial phase required each subject to explain the intent 
of the protagonist and the consequence of his acts in each of 
three stories. This procedure was done to determine if each 
subject understood the two dimensions of story information present 
in the stories. First and second graders were not able to make 
the cognitive inferences necessary to identify the intention of
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the story protagonist in the "standard" stories, so they were 
tested only on the "simple" (explicit intent) stories. The second 
phase of the procedure involved the presentation of stimulus 
stories in a two story choice situation. Subjects listened to 
three story pairs. The first two story pairs varied either the 
intentions of the protagonist or the outcome of the story while 
keeping the other variable constant across the story pairs. The 
final story pair was presented in the traditional Piagetian pairing. 
The rationale for this procedure was to first sensitize the subject 
to the multidimensional aspects of the stimulus stories prior to 
testing them on a traditional Piagetian choice task. The third 
phase of the procedure introduced the integration task and the 12 
point scale subjects were to use to evaluate the relative naughtiness 
of the protagonist. Each subject was given a practice set of six 
stories after being given two anchor stories which identified the 
end points of the scale with just noticeably more extreme examples 
of intention and consequence information than present in the test 
stories.
The final phase of the procedure was the presentation of the 
two original anchor stories and the 19 test stories. The stories 
involved three levels of intent and four levels of consequence 
information in a 3 x 4, design, plus an additional seven stories; 
three intent only and four consequence only stories. Stories were 
presented on audio cassette, with each story repeated twice before 
a judgment was recorded. The intertrial interval was seven seconds
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with a three to five minute rest period between presentations of the 
simple and standard stories. The entire procedure for each set of 
stories took approximately 20 minutes.
Analysis of the data highlight how the use of the functional 
measurement approach allows one to better identify how and when 
individuals integrate intention and consequence information.
Data from the Piagetian choice task indicate how use of the 
Piagetian-type methodology over-simplifies the nature of the moral 
judgment task. The age trend data supports Piaget's initial 
findings with 69% of the first graders relying on damage (outcome) 
information while only 9% of the college students relied on this 
information in making moral judgments. The data does classify 
subjects as either moral "objectives," moral "subjectives" or in 
transition but, it does not identify subjects who use multidimensional 
strategies in making their judgments. In contrast, the moral 
judgment data presented in the simple and standard story intention by 
consequence design specifies how subjects use the story information 
to formulate a unitary moral judgment.
The data from the standard stories supported the findings of 
Surber (1977; 1982). Third grade through adult subjects all used 
an adding or averaging integration rule when making moral judgments. 
Again, although there was no developmental trend in the type of 
integration rule used, there was a developmental trend in which older 
subjects weighted intention information more heavily.
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In the simple story format subjects appeared to use a number 
of different integration rules. Consistent with the evaluations 
subjects made in the standard stories, most second graders through 
adults used a linear integration rule which was evident from the 
absence of any significant interaction between the different 
levels of intent and consequence information. The majority of 
subjects made judgments which involved adding together the relative 
values of both the intentions of the actor as well as the 
consequences of his actions. In addition, there was no evidence 
to support an age trend in the use of intent information. This is 
most likely due to the fact that the intentions where explicitly 
stated and did not require subjects to make inferences from 
other story information.
In contrast, analysis of the simple story data from the 
first grade group did reveal a significant intent x consequence 
interaction. Examination of the individual subject data suggests 
that first graders either ignored intentions completely, or 
integrated both intent and consequence information using either a 
linear integration rule or a multiplicative integration rule. The 
multiplicative rule is evident from the significant intention vy 
consequence interaction. These subjects ignored intent information 
when paired with the "no damage" condition of consequences but 
relied on both intent and consequence cues in all the other stimulus 
conditions. Results from the single-cue stories, where either 
intent only or consequence only information was presented, indicated
that subjects invoked an averaging type rule, infering a mildly 
negative consequence from negative intention cues.
The diversity of findings from this study suggests that 
integration rules employed by individual subjects reflect a range 
of unidentified individual differences, stage of development, and 
the situational specificity in which the judgment occurs. When 
subjects were given different combinations of information they 
employed different integration rules, a finding which reflects the 
situational specificity of moral judgments which Hartshorn and May 
(1928) have previously indicated.
Additional work by Leon (1982, 1984) expanded the application 
of Anderson's (1981) functional measurement approach of studying 
stimulus integration by expanding the number of stimulus dimensions 
(Leon, 1982) and by investigating commonalities in rule usage 
between mothers and their six- and seven-year-old sons (Leon,
1984).
Leon (1982) tested six- and seven-year-old children on 
stories similar to those used in Leon (1980) by employing a similar 
procedure (phase 3 and 4 Leon, 1980) he combined 3 levels of 
intent (accident through malice), 3 levels of outcome (no damage 
to high damage) and 3 levels of rationale (remorse, admission of 
guilt, and belligerence). An improvement in this study over 
Leon (1980) is an adequate test of individual subject integration 
rules, Anderson (1981) has emphasized that a functional measurement 
approach requires a repeated measures design with replications to
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test for individual response variations. Of the 39 subjects tested, 
20 applied an additive rule using (intentions and damage and 
rationale) as the basis for their moral evaluations, 12 subjects 
applied an additive rule to only two of the stimulus dimensions, 
and 7 subjects applied a configural rule, ignoring intent 
information when actors expressed a rationale of either 
belligerance or remorse, but using both the intention and rationale 
information when the story protagonist admitted guilt.
Leon interprets these findings as strong evidence for 
children's moral evaluations being represented by rule-governed 
response sets, with the additive rule providing the structure for 
integrating multiple dimensions of information. The important 
contribution of this research is that it is the first test of 
childrens' ability to integrate three sources of information 
regarding the moral conduct of others. The individual subject 
analyses indicate that all 39 children attended -to the rationale 
information while only 20 attended to the damage information in 
making their judgments. As Leon points out, the rationale 
information tended to distort children's judgments overriding 
intent and damage information in a number of cases, suggesting 
that moral judgments of young children are subject to a number of 
different factors (see Anderson 1980).
In a more recent study, Leon (1984) focused on the integration 
rules used by mothers and sons to evaluate moral conduct. Using 
similar methodologies as discussed above, this study investigated
34
the concordance in rule usage between 32 six- and seven-year-old 
boys and their mothers. Nine test stories representing a 3 x 3 
(intent x damage) design were used with the boys first giving 
their responses on a 12-point rating scale followed by their 
mothers responding to the same stories. Utilizing the functional 
measurement approach of determining the integration rules for 
individual subjects, Leon demonstrated a high degree of concordance 
between the individual integration rules used by mothers and their 
sons, Leon suggests a number of different theoretical 
interpretations of these findings (e.g., social learning versus 
information processing); however, for purposes of the present 
discussion, this research provides additional support for the 
utility of the functional measurement approach in identifying how 
individuals combine information when making moral judgments.
Grueneich's (1982b) study is the most methodologically 
comprehensive study of childrens' moral evaluations using a functional 
measurement approach. The study was limited to investigating how 
children used intentions and consequences in making moral judgments. 
However, this study and Leon (1982) are the only two studies to 
fully employ the functional measurement approach. Anderson (1974, 
1976) has indicated that to obtain statistically reliable data 
when investigating individual subject integration rules one must 
obtain at least two sets of judgments of the same story stimuli.
This is necessary to separate systematic from random variation in 
the subjects responding. Previously reviewed studies (Leon 1980,
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1984; Surber 1977, 1982) have failed to obtain two replications of 
the data thus limiting the precision of their methods for identifying 
individual rule usage. Like Surber (1982), Grueneich also investigated 
the effect of the presentation order of the intention and consequence 
stimuli. Grueneich's primary interest was to determine if changing 
the presentation order would also change the type of integration 
rule subjects used. The advantage of Grueneich's method over 
Surber's is that by obtaining two sets of responses to the story 
stimuli he was able to utilize analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
techniques to analyze the group data, as well as the individual 
subject responses. As a result Grueneich was able to specify with 
greater reliability the precise nature of the integration rules 
employed by individual subjects.
Another significant contribution of this investigation was 
the use of story grammar analysis (Stein and Glenn, 1979) to 
construct the stimulus stories. As discussed earlier, Grueneich 
and Trabasso (1981), Stein and Trabasso (1980), have emphasized 
the extreme variability in the structural characteristics of story 
material used in moral evaluation research. Grueneich (1982b) 
developed stimulus materials which reflect specific story categories 
which varied three levels of intention information within the 
"internal response" category, and three levels of consequence 
information within the "direct consequence" category. An example 
is presented in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here.
Childrens' responses to these stimulus stories were consistent 
with results obtained by Leon (1980, 1982, 1984) and Surber (1977, 
1982) because they supported the notion of rule governed response 
sets underlying the moral judgment process. In addition, the 
group data replicated the previously discussed findings of Surber
(1982) which demonstrated a recency effect in the order of 
stimulus presentation. However, although Surber's data indicated 
that the majority of subjects use a linear-type integration rule, 
Grueneich's individual analysis of subject responses suggested 
that children systematically used one of five rule types: (a) 
linear, (b) nonlinear multidimensional, (c) intention-only
(d) consequence-only or (e) no systematic rule.
Although Leon (1982, 1984) found evidence for systematic 
multidimensional rule usage by six- and seven-year-olds, Grueneich 
found that the majority of kindergarteners (9 of 12) failed to use 
a systematic integration rule of either a unidimensional or 
multidimensional nature. Of the third graders tested, 15 of 32 
(47%) used unidimensional response sets (consequence-only or 
intention-only) and 13 (40%) used multidimensional rules (linear 
or nonlinear). In contrast, 22 (69%) of the sixth graders used 
either a linear or non-linear multidimensional integration rule in 
making their moral evaluations. These results indicate a strong 
developmental trend in integrational capacity.
A possible source of the differences in the results from the 
two studies is the selection of stimulus materials. Recall that
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Leon constructed stimulus stories which explicitly conveyed 
intention information about damage to inanimate-obj ects while the 
Grueneich stories involve damage to an identified-friend. It is 
possible that the complexity of the Grueneich stories required a 
more sophisticated level of integrational capacity than did the 
studies used by Leon. In addition, Grueneich's stories also 
require greater inferential ability with respect to intention 
information.
Summary of the Information Integration Literature
The functional measurement approach of investigating stimulus 
integration has been used to empirically demonstrate that children 
integrate multiple dimensions of information when making moral 
judgments. There remains some confusion about the age at which 
children shift from an unsystematic response style to a single 
dimension and then to a multidimensional style of stimulus 
integration.
In support of Piaget's general observations about cognitive 
development and moral development in particular, it appears that 
younger children do place more weight on consequence/outcome 
information as compared with intention information. However, 
there is some evidence that this might be a function of inferential 
ability and not a function of intention information at all (Leon, 
1980; Grueneich, 1982b).
In any case, the few studies using an information integration 
approach consistently indicate the following findings: (a) there
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is a developmental progression resulting in an increasingly more 
sophisticated integration style (e.g., Surber, 1982, Leon, 1980, 
1982, Grueneich, 1982b); (b) the majority of investigations support 
a linear-type integration rule— either additive or averaging 
(e.g., Surber, 1977, Leon, 1980); (c) the information integration 
hypothesis accounts for how children combine informational cues 
in other areas of social judgment; (d) integration rule usage 
is sensitive to contextual cues, e.g., stimulus presentation 
order and the structural framework of the stories (Leon, 1982; 
Surber, 1982; Grueneich, 1982b); and (e) that children integrate 
information from a number of different sources. Intention and 
consequence dimensions are most likely not the only ones affecting 
children's moral evaluations (Stein and Trabasso, 1982; Grueneich, 
1982b). '
Rationale for the present investigation
The above review of the literature has illustrated many of 
the pitfalls researchers have encountered in their attempts to 
determine how children reason about moral behavior. Piaget's 
choice task format for investigating the basis of moral judgments 
has resulted in two enduring observations: (a) younger children 
initially rely on consequence information as the basis for their 
moral judgments; and (b) there are large individual differences in 
moral judgments which are situation specific. Attempts by numerous 
investigators to specify aspects of the judgment process critical 
to the shift in reasoning style has only resulted in highlighting 
how sensitive children are to the contextual and structural
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features of the choice-task methodology.
Dissatisfaction with traditional choice task methodologies 
(Keasey, 1978; Rest, 1983) has lead to wide variation in stimulus 
material construction. Grueneich and Trabasso (1981) have been 
most emphatic in pointing out the necessity of building a research 
literature based on a common methodological framework. Although the 
literature is repleat with different variations in story methodologies, 
there has been little success in identifying a method which can 
accommodate the systematic investigation of contextual cues which 
differentially affect the valence of intention and consequence 
story information.
The functional measurement approach Anderson (1976, 1980) has 
been developed to study stimulus integration and is a major advance 
in determining how different types of stimuli interact. In a 
developmental context, this methodology enhances the precision 
with which one can identify qualitative shifts in how children 
combine stimuli to make unitary socio-moral judgments. Coupled 
with this procedure, the story grammar of Stein and Glenn (1979) 
appears to be a reasonable choice for a standardized framework 
with which to systematically vary different aspects of the story
i
content.
Only one study to date, Grueneich (1982b) has successfully 
combined the two methodologies in an investigation of moral judgment.
As discussed above, results from this study have indicated how 
critical both the functional measurement approach and the story 
grammar framework are for building a comprehensive research repertoire
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that systematically isolates the effect of various stimulus 
combinations on children's moral judgments.
The present investigation extends Grueneich's research of 
how children integrate intention and consequence information to 
include the effects of two contextual cues. Using a functional 
measurement procedure, this study systematically varied the 
effects of story-protagonist age (eight years versus twelve years), 
personal goodness of the story-protagonist (good versus bad), 
three levels of intentions (accidental versus mischievious versus 
malicious), and three levels of consequences (no damage versus 
small damage versus large damage).
The traditional intention x consequence design employed by 
Grueneich indicated that stimulus presentation order only 
affects the valence of intention and consequence information, but 
does not affect the type of individual integration rules used by 
subjects. Results from his study validated the above methodological 
procedures for a two variable intention x consequence design, but 
did not advance our understanding of the impact of other factors 
on the integration of information in making moral judgments.
Leon's (1982) study was the only moral judgment study to 
introduce a third variable using a functional measurement procedure. 
"Rationale" as the third variable in the model had a significant 
effect on children's information integration strategies. In some 
cases "rationale" replaced intention or consequence information as 
the basis for evaluating the actor's conduct. The design of Leon's 
study limits the strength of his findings. "Rationale" information
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was always presented as the last piece of information, thus its 
apparent salience could have simply been a recency effect.
In the present study the two context variables— age and 
personal goodness represent information contained in the "setting" 
story category which was the first story category presented in the 
story episode. Stein and Trabasso (1980) define this category as 
the point in the episode where characters are introduced along 
with background information, a description of personal traits and 
dispositions. This category also sets the locale and time of the 
story. There is limited evidence in the literature that these 
variables affect social or moral judgments.
Only one developmental study in the moral judgment literature 
systematically varied the age of the story actor, in most 
cases the age of the story actor is not identified. Buldain,
Crano, and Wegner (1982) varied age, intention and outcome in a 
study of kindergarten, third-grade, and sixth-grade children. The 
three levels of age were two years younger than the subject, same 
age, or two years older. Results indicated that age of story 
actor significantly affected childrens' judgment, same age actors 
were typically judged more leniently when negative outcomes were 
matched with good intentions.
In related research on social judgment and referential 
communication, Shatz (1978) has noted that children under a number 
of different task requirements respond differentially to younger 
and older children. Most notably in the referential communication 
tasks Gelman and Shatz (1977) have observed four-year-olds adjusting
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their conversational style when addressing younger and older 
children. Because age is a significant environmental cue affecting 
childrens' behavior on different tasks it could also have a 
differential effect on their moral judgments. When the age of the 
story actor remains unidentified in the stimulus stories, it is 
possible that it could represent a significant source of error 
variance affecting childrens' moral judgments in as yet unspecified 
ways. The research of Buldain et al. (1982) suggested that in 
a moral judgment task only same age actors were treated 
differentially. Therefore, two levels of age were varied, eight 
years and twelve years.
The second contextual cue varied in the study is the personal 
goodness of the story actor. There is no direct evidence of the 
affect of this variable on childrens' moral judgments. However, 
Brooks and Daub (1975) investigated the effect of personal goodness 
on social judgment in adults. These researchers observed that the 
perceived overall goodness of individuals on trial for similar 
crimes systematically affected the judgment of the jury. Individuals 
perceived as typically "good" were judged more leniently by juries 
than were individuals perceived as typically "bad". In addition, 
Grueneich (1982a), Anderson (1981) have both suggested that ancillary 
pieces of information not directly related to either the intentions 
of the story protagonist, or to the consequences of his/her actions 
could differentially affect children's judgments. Thus, in the 
present study, two levels (good and bad) of personal goodness are 
included to test whether children and adults systematically integrate 
this information when making moral evaluations.
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Hypotheses
Several hypotheses were developed for the present study.
They are:
(a) age of the story protagonist will differentially affect 
the severity of the observer's moral judgments. This 
will be reflected in a grade x age interaction.
(b) personal goodness represents a salient contextual cue 
which is integrated into the judgment process. This 
effect will be observed as a main effect for goodness 
across all grades.
(c) Individual differences in integration rules will 
indicate different processing styles for younger 
and older subjects. Individual subject analysis 
will specify the type of integration rules used 
by individual subjects as well as indicate the 
predominate integration rule for each age group.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 20 third graders and 20 sixth graders from 
medium to high SES families recruited from two local private college 
preparatory schools. Mean ages of these two samples were 8 years,
11 months for the third-grade and 12 years, 3 months for the 
sixth-grade students. In addition, 20 undergraduates recruited 
from psychology classes constituted the adult sample. The mean 
age of the adult group was 22 years, 3 months.
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Stimulus Materials
Stimuli conformed to the story-category structure of Stein 
and Glenn (1979) for the single story episode. In each case the 
stimulus materials adhered to Stein and Glenn's definition of a 
well formed story and included five of their six defined story 
categories connected by logical relations in the story context. 
Stimulus stories developed by Grueneich (1982b) were adapted to 
include two additional pieces of information in the setting 
category. The additional pieces of information were personal 
characteristics of the story protagonist— age (8 versus 12) and 
personal goodness (good versus bad). These two independent variables 
represented contextual cues which are orthogonal to either the 
intention or consequence information presented in the stories.
The stimuli presented in Appendix A were combined into the 36 
story episodes used as stimulus materials. As an example, the 
story below involves a combination of the variables "eight" years 
old, a "good" level of personal goodness, a mischievous intent, 
and a large injury. (See Appendix B for all 36 story 
combinations.)
Setting Once there was a (good) boy named John who
f
was (eight) years old.
Initiating One day John and a friend were playing in
Event the park. John found an old baseball.
Internal John was feeling playful and wanted to scare
Response his friend a little bit.
Attempt John threw the ball.
Direct The ball hit his friend in the face and
Consequence gave him a bloody nose.
In addition to the two levels of two independent variables in the 
Setting category, three levels of both intention information and 
consequence information were varied within the Internal Response 
and Direct Consequence story categories. Levels of intention 
information were accidental, mischievous, and malicious intent. 
Levels of consequence information represented personal damage 
outcomes of no injury, a small injury (bruised leg), or a large 
injury (bloody nose). Each story consisted of one of thirty-six 
factorial combinations of story stimuli, which formed a 2 (age) x 
2 (goodness) x 3 (intention) x 3 (consequence) within-subjects 
factorial design.
Response Scale
For the third- and sixth-grade subjects the response scale 
consisted of nine \ inch bright red dowels varying in height 
placed on a 3V' x 20 " black rectangular base of wood. The 
shortest dowel was 3/4 of an inch, with the height of each 
successive dowel increasing by 3/4 of an inch. The rating scale 
was designed to represent increasing levels of punishment the 
story protagonist could receive for his conduct. Subjects chose 
the amount of punishment by pointing to the representative dowel 
on the rating scale. Prior to the presentation of the test 
stories each subject was given standard instructions explaining
that the response scale represented the amount of punishment the 
story protagonist could be given. In addition, subjects were read 
two stories which served as anchors for each end point on the 
rating scale. The anchor stories represented story outcomes just 
noticeably more benign or severe than any of the test stories.
See Appendix C for the standard instructions and anchor stories.
The rating scale for the adult subjects was a paper and 
pencil version of the three dimensional scale used with the 
younger subjects. It was included in the individual answer 
booklets used by adult subjects in a group testing procedure. The 
wording of the standardized instructions for the adults was 
modified to reflect an age appropriate explanation of the 
instructions given to the child subjects, the answer booklet 
consisted of 36 pages (one for each story) each having a separate 
rating scale for recording the subject's responses.
Procedure
Third- and sixth-grade subjects participated in two 
individual interview sessions conducted during school hours in a 
private interview area designated by the school. During both the 
initial and replication interviews each subject was read the 
standard instructions, the rating scale anchor stories, and the 
two sample stories. The 36 test stories were presented via audio 
tape in one of four predetermined random presentation orders 
(see Appendix D). Subjects received different presentation orders 
during the initial testing session and the replication session one
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week later. After hearing each story, the subject was asked four 
probe questions to assure that each subject was aware of all the 
salient story information. The four probe questions were:
failed to correctly answer any of the probe questions the story was 
repeated. Upon successfully recalling the story information each 
subject was asked to rate how much punishment the story protagonist 
should be given by pointing to one of the nine dowels on the rating 
scale. After the presentation of the first 18 stories during the 
testing session, each subject was asked if he/she wished to take a 
break. At this point in the procedure the rating scale was 
reestablished by reading the subject the two anchor stories before 
proceeding with the testing session.
Adult subjects were tested in a similar procedure which also 
included being read the standard instructions, the rating scale 
anchor stories and the two sample stories. The scale used by the 
third- and sixth-grade subjects was explained to the adult subjects 
and was clearly visible throughout the testing session. Prior to 
the testing procedure the adult subjects were randomly assigned to 
one of four interview groups for both the initial testing and the 
replication session. Each of the four groups received one of the 
four randomly deter,omed story presentation orders.
Data Analysis
The analysis was conducted in two phases. The first phase
(a) How old is ________
or bad boy? (c) Why did 
happened when _________
? (b) Is
threw the ball? If the subject
_________  usually a good
throw the ball? (d) What
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examined group differences. Specifically grade differences and 
the interaction of grade with the within subject factors of 
protagonist's age, personal goodness, intentions and consequences.
The second phase involved individual subject analyses (see 
Leon 1982; Grueneich 1982b). These analyses examined individual 
response patterns as a reflection of the individual integration 
rules. Individual integration rules were classified into one of 
four rule types: (1) unsystematic or random, (2) unidimensional,
(3) linear multidimensional, or (4) nonlinear multidimensional.
After the individual subject classification of rule type, a chi 
square analysis by grade was conducted to identify differences in 
rule usage across grade.
Results and Discussion
The results were analyzed in two ways. First, an overall 3 
(grade) x 2 (personal goodness) x 2 (protagonist age) x 3 
(intention) x 3 (consequence) ANOVA was performed to test the 
effects of these independent variables on subjects' 
punishment responses. The main effect for grade was not 
significant, F(2, 57) = 2.20, £ < .12. The overall ANOVA for 
all 60 subjects resulted in significant main effects for all 
four story variables with significant 2 way interactions for 
personal goodness of the protagonist by subject grade level, the 
intentions of the story protagonist by subject grade level, and 
consequence by subject grade level. Contrary to hypothesis 1, grade 
by age of protagonist interaction was not significant, F (2,1995) = 
.30, £<.73. Moreover, all remaining interactions were not
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significant. The data in Table 4 provides the mean punishment 
responses given by each subject group for each combination of story 
variables.
Insert Table 4 about here
With respect to the significant main effects, story actors 
who were given the personal attribute of "bad" were punished more 
harshly than those described as "good", F(2, 1995) = 144.46,
£ <.0001. The mean for the "good" character was 4.31, and the 
mean for the "bad" character was 5.01. The age of the protagonist 
also had a significant effect on overall subject responses,
F(l, 1995) = 6.15, £ < .01. Older protagonists were judged more 
harshly than younger onek. Twelve-year-old protagonists received a 
mean punishment score of 4.73 versus a mean punishment score of 4.58 
for eight-year-old protagonists. The effect for intent of the 
protagonist's actions was also significant, F(2, 1995) = 372.94,
£ <.001. Story actors who were characterized as having a malicious 
or harmful intent were judged more harshly than those who were 
characterized as expressing mischievous or accidental intentions.
The mean punishment scores for malicious, mischievous, and accidental 
levels of intent were 5.74, 4.40, and 3.38, respectively. Using 
Scheffe's procedure there were significant differences among the means 
for all levels of intent (£ < .05). The main effect for the fourth 
story variable, consequence was also significant, F(2, 1995) = 468.90, 
£ <.0001. Behavioral acts that resulted in a bloody nose were
judged more harshly than those resulting in the less injurious 
consequence of a small bruise, which in turn was judged less 
harshly than acts which resulted in no physical injury. The 
means for these three levels of consequences were 5.84, 4.46, and 
3.67, respectively. Scheffe's procedure indicated that there 
were significant differences among the means for all levels of the 
consequence (p .05).
The significant 2-way interactions of subject grade with 
the three story variables personal goodness, intent, and' 
consequences indicated a developmental shift in the overall 
importance of these variables for third-grade, sixth-grade, 
and adult subjects. Using Scheffe's procedure to test for 
differences among means it was determined that all higher 
order differences of differences were significant (j> ^  .05).
With respect to personal goodness, a differential effect 
emerged for all three subject groups, F(2, 1995) = 7.14, 
p .001. The overall magnitude of the effect was greatest 
for third graders, then adults, and sixth graders. As shown in 
Figure 2, the effect is in the same direction for all three 
age groups, with third graders making greater discriminations
I
in their judgment responses than either the sixth graders or the 
adults.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
The intentions of the story protagonist also had a differential 
effect on each subject group, F(4, 1995) = 46.27, £ ( .0001. 
Figure 3 illustrates the differences in the mean subject 
responses for third-grade, sixth-grade, and adult subjects. 
Whereas all subjects punished boys with malicious intentions 
more harshly, response discrimination among the three levels of 
intent was greatest for adults and least for third-graders.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
The consequence resulting from the actions of the protagonist 
also differentially affected the punishment responses of 
all subject groups, F(4, 1995) = 3.01, £ (.02. As illustrated 
in Figure 4, sixth-graders judgments were the least harsh of 
all three age groups.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
The pattern of the interaction between subject grade and 
consequence is also consistent with the interaction between 
subject grade and intent. In both cases third-grade subjects 
made less of a discrimination between the two least severe 
levels of intention and consequence. On the other hand, sixth 
graders and adults made greater discriminations.
The second phase of data analysis involved the determination
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of individual subject integration rules. A 2 (personal goodness) x 
2 (protagonist age) x 3 (intentions) x 3 (consequence) ANOVA 
procedure was used to identify the individual response patterns 
of all 60 subjects, this analysis was possible because two sets 
of scores had been obtained from all the subjects. Individual 
subject integration rules were determined by using the following 
schema— an alpha level of .05 was chosen for designating 
significant main effects with either 1 and 36 df (e.g., goodness 
of protagonist), or 2 and 36 df (e.g., intentions and consequences) 
and interactions with either 1 and 36 df (e.g., goodness x age),
2 and 36 df (e.g., goodness x intent) or 4 and 36 df (e.g., 
intentions x consequences). Subjects whose ANOVA indicated no 
significant effects were classified as using an unsystematic rule 
in making their judgments of punishment. Subjects whose ANOVA 
indicated a single main effect but no interactions were classified as 
using a unidimensional integration rule, relying on one of four 
independent variables when making their judgments. Subjects whose 
ANOVA indicated two, three, or four significant main effects but no 
interactions were classified as using a multidimensional linear 
(additive) integration rule. Whereas subjects whose ANOVA indicated 
at least one main effect and at least one interaction were classified 
as using some type of nonlinear integration rule. The data from these 
analyses are summarized in Table 5 with respect to the number of 
subjects within each age group who were classified as using one of four
possible information integration rules.
Insert Table 5 about here
Chi-square analyses were performed to determine if there
was a significant developmental difference in the frequency of
rule usage. Before conducting the analyses the "unsystematic"
and "unidimensional" cells in Table 5 were combined due to the
small number of cases in the "unsystematic" cells. Results of
the analyses indicated no difference between the number of
third graders and sixth graders using the unidimensional,
multidimensional, and nonlinear types of integration rules, 
o
X (2) = .98, n.s. However the chi-square analyses did reveal 
significant differences in the type of integration rules used 
by adults as compared with third-grade, or sixth-grade children, 
X^(2) = 8.09, £^.05, and X^(2) = 10.98, £ { .05, respectively. 
Further specification of individual subject differences revealed 
the frequency with which each of the independent story variables 
was used by subjects in making their punishment judgments.
Table 6 specifies which combinations of variables were used by 
subjects who integrated story information in a linear fashion, 
adding one or more variables together in making a judgment to 
punish the protagonist. If one examines the use of the 
unidimensional Consequence-only integration rule, one will 
notice that 3 third graders, 7 sixth graders, and 0 adults
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utilized this strategy in making their punishment judgments. 
Similarly when one looks at the multidimensional 
Intention-Consequence (I-C) rule, one will notice that one 
third grader, two sixth graders and 10 adults utilized this 
strategy in making their punishment judgments.
Insert Table 6 about here.
Table 7 depicts the combinations of variables that were used by 
subjects who make judgments on the basis of a nonlinear integration 
rule. Nonlinear integration rules used by the three adult subjects 
always involved the integration of personal goodness, intentions, 
and consequence story information (G-I-C), that was differentially 
affected by unique combinations of other story information. For 
example, an adult using a nonlinear rule would linearly combine 
personal goodness, intention and consequence information.
However, the weights associated with these peices of information 
would be differentially affected by the interaction between the 
age of the story protagonist and the type of intention. In 
contrast with the adult nonlinear integration styles, each of the 
five third-grade subjects utilized a different information integration 
style.
Insert Table 7 about here.
The principle focus of the present investigation was to 
extend recent applications of the information integration 
methodology to more complex moral judgment tasks. Previous 
work by Leon (1980), Grueneich (1982b), and Surber (1977, 1982) 
applied this methodology to stories involving the manipulation 
of two variables— intentions and consequences. This study sought 
to replicate their basic findings as well as explore the utility 
of the information integration approach when applied to a four 
variable model. This involved maintaining the two crucial story 
cues of intention and consequence information as well as two 
additional story cues extrinsic to the major story action. The two 
additional variables chosen for this study were the personal 
goodness and the age of the story protagonist.
Three hypotheses beyond the basic replication data were 
developed for the study. The first hypothesis predicted that 
subjects of different ages (grades) would make differential 
punishments based on the age of the story protagonist. The 
absence of a grade x age interaction discontinued this prediction. 
The second hypothesis predicted that personal goodness was a 
salient contextual cue which is integrated into the judgment 
process. This hypothesis was confirmed by a significant main 
effect for goodness in the group analysis. The third hypothesis 
predicted a developmental shift in information integration 
processing styles for younger and older subjects. This was 
confirmed by the individual subject analyses which revealed
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significant differences in the predominant processing style 
of adults compared to third- and sixth-grade youngsters. With 
respect to subject stimulus preferences, a number of individual 
differences emerged indicating that although individuals processed 
information using similar integration rules, there was 
substantial variation in the salience of the four stimulus 
dimensions.
Analysis of Group Data
On the basis of the group data children appear as capable as 
adults in their ability to evaluate multiple sources of information 
in moral judgment tasks. These findings are consistent with 
a number of previous studies, irrespective of their 
methodological inconsistencies, which have indicated that 
children use both intention and consequence information.
Whereas the present investigation confirms this finding 
it also provides evidence that moral judgments can involve 
more than simply an evaluation of intentions and consequences.
The four independent story variables - personal goodness, 
protagonist age, intention and consequences all represent 
significant sources of information to third graders, sixth 
graders and adults. This finding supports what Karniol (1978) 
found in her extensive review of how children evaluate moral 
behavior. She described a number of studies indicating that 
5-to-10 year old children pay attention to intention cues, 
consequence cues, and "mitigating circumstances". However,
none of the research cited involved the systematic variation 
of both intent and consequence, and circumstantial story 
information. In addition, the absence of significant 
interactions between the story (treatment) variables in the 
present study support an additive or averaging model of 
information integration. This finding is consistent with the 
majority of findings from studies on moral judgment which have 
used an information integration methodology. Leon (1980, 1982, 
1984) demonstrated in his group data that the majority of his 
subjects used linear integration rules. Surber (1977, 1982) 
also demonstrated that kindergarten, second-grade, and 
fifth-grade children integrate intention and consequence 
information in a linear fashion when evaluating the behavior of 
a five-year-old girl.
Changes in the age of the story protagonist had a 
significant but not a qualitatively different effect on the 
subject groups. As one would expect 12-year-old boys are viewed 
as more culpable for their actions than are eight-year-olds.
There were however, significant interactions between grade and 
three of four story variables. This strongly suggests that these 
variables differentially influence the judgment making process 
of third-grade, sixth-grade, and adult subjects.
The only developmental shift evident from these three 
interactions is the varying degree of punitiveness meted out by 
the different subject groups. The emergence of this
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developmental trend is important because it provides an 
indication of how third-grade, sixth-grade, and adult subjects 
discriminate among very distinct levels of circumstantial and 
crucial story information when making punishment judgments.
For example, it is apparent from Figure 2 that all three subject 
groups differentiated between the characteristic of "good" and 
"bad". The effect was most dramatic for the third graders. In 
Figure 3 the punishment responses of the adult subjects appeared 
to be influenced to a greater degree by all three levels of 
intentions than those of the third- and sixth-grade subjects. 
Intentionality cues appeared to strongly influence the punishment 
responses of third and sixth graders only if it was seen as 
malicious. The response patterns of third- and sixth-grade 
subjects were very similar across the three levels of the 
intention variable, whereas for the consequence variable in Figure 4, 
the sixth-grade response pattern diverged from that of the 
third graders and instead appears very similar to the adult 
subject responses. This suggests a developmental shift in 
how sixth graders are discriminating between the three levels 
of consequence cues when making their punishment judgments.
The continued accumulation of data of this type will provide 
additional insight into just how children and adult subjects 
differentially use their ability to integrate information.
This is of particular importance if information integration 
theorists are to successfully address criticisms which suggest
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the model can only account for processing deficiencies but 
cannot address why subjects extract different types of 
information from stories (e.g. Rest, 1984).
In summary, the group data supports the notion of multiple 
stimulus integration by children and adults in moral judgment 
tasks. The integration style used by the majority of subjects 
supports either an additive or averaging model of stimulus 
integration. In addition, there is a significant shift in 
the way younger and older subjects discriminate between the 
levels of the story variables in using the story information 
to make moral evaluations of the protagonist's behavior.
Individual Subject Analyses
The individual subject analyses provide a much different 
picture of subject information integration styles, and clearly 
identified a wide range of individual differences. Processing 
styles in third-grade subjects ranged from totally random 
responses to complex nonlinear integration responses involving 
all four story variables and two, 2-way interactions. Information 
processing styles for the sixth-grade group included subjects using 
unidimensional, multidimensional, and nonlinear integration rules—  
again there was evidence of individuals additively integrating 
three and four story variables when making their punishment judgments. 
The adult subjects were equally diverse in their individual processing 
styles. Thus, the individual subject analysis provides good evidence 
that individuals eight years and older are capable of integrating
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multiple sources of stimulus information. Although this data is 
consistent with other reports of information integration, it extends 
the application of this methodology in an important way. Previous 
studies (e.g., Leon, 1980) have shown that children as young 
as six years of age integrate two stimulus dimensions when 
making moral judgments. Leon's study, like the present 
investigation, used a single story episode as the structural 
basis of the stimulus stories. However, the story variables 
he manipulated all appeared in the latter stages of the 
story episode thus allowing the possibility that the results 
could simply be a recency effect. The present investigation 
manipulated two story variables in the setting category as well 
as the internal event and consequence story categories. The 
fact that subjects were able to integrate information from all 
three of these story categories strongly supports the contention 
that children can extract information equally well from 
all the parts of the story (Stein and Trabasso, 1981).
Several findings from the present study require further 
consideration. The majority of the sixth-grade subjects relied 
almost exclusively on the consequences of the story action 
as the basis of their punishment responses. This is 
inconsistent with the majority of findings in the moral 
judgment literature. In most cases 12-year-old children 
base their moral judgments on intention cues and not the 
consequence cues in the stimulus stories. However, in the
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present study 7 of 8 sixth-grade subjects who relied on a 
unidimensional integration rule made their judgments on the 
basis of consequence cues. In contrast only 3 of 5 
third-grade subjects who utilized a unidimensional integration rule 
based their judgments on consequence cues. In the overall 
sample, the story consequence cue was an important story cue for 
19 of the 20 sixth graders, and for only 15 of the 20 third 
graders thus indicating that it was a more salient cue 
for sixth graders than it was for third graders. This is most 
likely very consistent with their life experience. Consequences 
are very important to sixth graders— one gets punished at school 
and home for inappropriate behavior, actions, etc. on a routine 
basis. For third graders it may not yet be clear to them just what 
is the basis for punishment. Both school teachers and parents tend to 
be less consistent in their punishments of third graders than 
sixth graders. The reliance on consequence information by sixth 
graders could he a result of a more selective integration process 
which is independent of their capacity for integrating information. 
This separate ability to discriminate between story cues on 
the basis of subjective relevance could be a strategy not yet
I
available to third graders. A selective integration process 
also seems to be operating for sixth-grade and adult subjects 
who integrate story information on the basis of a 
multidimensional linear integration rule. Five of 6 
sixth-grade subjects who used a multidimensional integration 
rule relied solely on two dimensions when making their judgments,
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whereas only 3 of 8 third graders made judgments on the basis of 
two story cues. The converse of this is that 5 of 8 third graders 
who used a multidimensional integration rule relied on at least 
three of the four story cues, whereas only 1 of 6 sixth graders did. 
This same trend is apparent in the adult sample, 13 of 16 who used 
a multidimensional integration rule relied on two story cues whereas 
3 of 16 integrated three story cues as the basis of their punishment 
responses. Together, this data indicates a developmental pattern 
toward a selective information integration process, where older 
children and adults actively choose and subjectively weight which 
information is more salient. Thus, despite similarities in their 
information integration capacities, third graders, sixth graders, 
and adults differentially express this ability when making punishment 
judgments.
In conclusion, the present study has demonstrated that 
children and adults can integrate multiple sources of 
information from a number of different story categories. It 
confirmed the previous findings that suggested children and 
adults use a number of different information integration styles, 
as well as identified individual differences in the perceived 
significance of the four story variables. Present findings 
also suggest the development of a selective integration process 
where individuals make judgments of moral transgressions on the 
basis of subjective selection criteria.
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Table 1
Story Grammar Categories
Story Category
(1) Setting
(2) Initiating Event
(3) Internal Response
(4) Attempt
(5) Direct Consequence
(6) Reaction
Function
Introduction of characters 
background information; 
setting of locale and 
time, and description of 
personal traits and 
dispositions.
An event or happening 
which begins a characters 
behavior sequence. The 
initiating event evokes 
some "internal response" 
in the protagonist.
Includes objective or 
emotional responses, 
goals or desires, and 
thoughts or cognitions.
Overt action by the 
protagonist to satisfy 
some goal.
Provides indication of 
whether or not the 
protagonist obtained 
his/her goal.
A response initiated by 
the direct consequence 
on the part of the 
protagonist or some other 
character. Generally, 
reactions indicate how 
the protagonist feels, 
but may also indicate 
how other characters 
are affected.
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Table 2
Examples of Stories Used by Stein and Trabasso.
Version of the Secret Trip (Lying Theme)
Setting: 1.
2.
Once there were two kids named Peter and Mary 
who lived across the street from one another.
Initiating Event: 3.-
4.
One morning, Peter called Mary
and asked Mary to come over and play.
Internal Response: 5.
6.
But Mary wanted to go shopping
and she didn't want to tell Peter where she was going.
Attempt: 7.
8.
So Mary told Peter she was sick 
and couldn't come over to play.
Consequence: 9.
10.
Then Mary went shopping
and bought a brand new skateboard.
Reaction: 11.
12.
Mary thought it was a really special toy 
and was glad she had kept her shopping trip a 
secret from Peter.
Experimental Categories Added to the Secret Trip (Lying Theme)
Setting: 1.
2.
The next day was Peter's birthday
and Mary always gave Peter a birthday present.
Initiating Event: 1.
2.
Mary's friend told her that the next day was Peter's 
birthday
and that he might like a birthday present.
Internal Response: 1.
2.
Mary knew that the next day was Peter's birthday 
and she thought about a birthday present.
Consequence: 1.
2.
Mary gave Peter a birthday present 
on the next day.
Reaction: 1.
2.
Mary was excited about giving Peter a birthday 
present
on the next day.
*Stein & Trabasso (1981, p. 165-166)
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Table 3
Example of Stories Used by Grueneich. 
Story Category Storv Content
Setting
Initiating event
Internal response:
Intention level 1 
(accidental)
Intention level 2 
(mischievous)
Intention level 3 
(malicious)
Attempt
Direct consequence:
Consequence level 1 
(no damage)
Consequence level 2 
(bruised leg)
Consequence level 3 
(bloody nose)
Once there was a boy named John.
One day John and a friend were 
playing in the park. John 
found an old baseball.
John wanted to hit a tree with the 
ball, but he did not know that 
his friend was near the tree.
John was feeling playful and 
wanted to scare his friend a 
little bit.
John was feeling angry and felt 
like hurting someone.
John threw the ball.
The ball hit his friend, but his 
friend did not get hurt.
The ball hit his friend on the leg 
and gave him a small bruise.
The ball hit his friend in the face 
and gave him a bloody nose.
(Grueneich, 1982b)
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APPENDICES
S t i m u l u s  m s t • r i *  I s :
i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s  
s t o r y  c s t s g o r y :  S E T T I N G  
p e r s o n a l  g o o d n a s s :  ( I I  g o o d  C On c e  t h s r s  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  J o h n . . . ]
( 2 )  b a d  C Qn c a  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m a d  J o h n . . . }
a g a  o f  a c t o r :  ( 1 3  s i g h t  [ . . . w h o  w a s  s i g h t  y a a r s  o l d . ]
( 2 )  t w e l v e  ( . . . w h o  w a s  t w e l v e  y e a r s  o l d . )
s t o r y  c a t e g o r y :  I N I T I A T I N G  E V E N T
C l )  O n e  d a y  J o h n  a n d  a f r i e n d  w a r s  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  
p a r k .  J o h n  f o u n d  an o l d  b a s e b a l l .
s t o r y  c a t e g o r y :  I N T E R N A L  R E S P O N S E
i n t e n t i o n  o f  a c t o r :  C l )  a c c i d e n t a l  [ J o h n  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e
b a l l . ]
C 2 )  m i s c h i e v o u s  [ J o h n  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  
w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  a 
little bit.l
C 3 )  m a l i c i o u s  [ J o h n  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k  
h u r t i n g  s o me  o n a . 1
s t o r y  c a t e g o r y :  A T T E M P T
C l )  J o h n  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l ,  
s t o r y  c a t e g o r y :  D I R E C T  C O N S E Q U E N C E  
c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  a c t o r ' s  a t t e m p t :
C l )  no  d a m a g e  C T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d ,  b u t  h i s  
f r i e n d  d i d  n o t  g e t  h u r t .
C 2 )  s m a l l  [ T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i a  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  l e g  a n d
g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l  b r u i s e . ]
C 3 )  l a r g e  [ T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e
a n d  g a v e  h i m  a b l o o d y  n o s e . )
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Appendix 8
T e s t S t o r i e s
1 . S T O R Y  1 /  1 /  1 /  1
" O n c e  t h e r e w a s  a g o o d b o y n a m e  d G e o r g e w h o  wa  s 3 y e a r s o 1 d
O n e d a y  G e o r g e  a n d  a f r i e n d w e r e p 1 a y  i n g i n t h e p a r k .  G e o r g e  f o u n d a n
o 1 d b a s e b a l l .  G e o r g e w a n t e d t o h i t a t r e e  w i t h t h e b a l l . G e o r g e  t h r e w
t h e b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t h i s  f r i e n d b u t h i s  f r i e n d d i d n o t  g e t  h u r t . "
2 . S T O R Y  1 /  2 /  1 /  1
" O n c e  t h e r e w a s  a g o o d b o y n a me  d J i m w h o w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e d a y  J i m  a n d  a f r i e n d  we  r e p 1 a y i ng i n  t h e p a r k  . J i m  f o u n d  a n  o l d
b a s e b a l l .  J i m  w a n t e d t o  h i t a t r e e w i t h t h e b a  1 1 . J i m t h r e w t h e
b a 1 I . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s f r i e n d b u t h i s  f r i e n d d i d n o t g e t  h u r t . "
3 .  S T OBV  1 / 2 / 2 / 1
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  B r u c e  w h o  w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  B r u c e  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  8 r u c e  f o u n d  a n  
o l d  b a s e b a l l .  B r u c e  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  
f r i e n d  a l i t t l e  b i t . 8 r u c e  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  
h i s  f r i e n d  d i d  n o t  g e t  h u r t . "
4 . S T O R Y  I /  2 /  2 /  2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  A d a m  w h o  w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  A d a m  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  A d a m ,  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  A d a m  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  a 
l i t t l e  b i t . A d a m  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  l e g  a n d  
g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l  b r u i s e . "
5 .  S T O R Y  1 / 2 / 3 / 2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  P a t  w h o  w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  P a t  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  P a t  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  P a t  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o me  o n e . P a t 
t h r e w  t h e  b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  on t h e  l e g  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l  
bruise."
6 .  S T O R Y  1 . / 2 / 3 / 3
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  N e d  w h o  w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  N e d  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  N e d  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  N e d  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o m e o n e . N e d  
t h r e w  t h e  b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a b l o o d y  
nose."
7 .  S T O R Y  2 / 2 / 3 7 3
" O n c e t h e r e  w a s  a b a d b o y  n a me  d Pe  t e r w h o wa  s 1 2 y e a r s o 1 d
O n e  d a y  Pe t e r  a n d a f r i e n d  w e r e p l a y i n g  i n t h e p a r k . Pe t e r f o u n d a n
o l d  b a s e b a I I .  P e t e r w a s  f e e l i n g a n g r y  a n d f e 1 t l i k e h u r t i n g
s o m e o n e . P e I e r ' t h r e w t h e  b a l l . T h e b a l l  h i t  h i 3 f r i e n d i n t h e f a c e a n d
g a v e  h i m  a b l o o d y n o s e . "
8S
8 .  S T O R Y  2 /  2 / 3 / 2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  R i c K  w h o  w a s  12  y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  R i c k  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  R i c k  f o u n d  a n  o l d
b a s e b a l l .  R i c k  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o m e o n e . R i c k  
t h r e w  t h e  b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  l e g  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l  
bruise."
9 .  S T O R Y  1 1 1 1 2 1 1
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  S a m  w h o  w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  S a m a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  S a m f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  S a m w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  a 
l i t t l e  b i t . S a m  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  l e g  a n d  
g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l  b r u i s e . "
1 0 .  S T O R Y  2 / 2 / 2 / 1
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  K u r t  w h o  w a s  12  y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  K u r t  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  K u r t  f o u n d  a n  o l d
b a s e b a l l .  K u r t  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  a 
l i t t l e  b i t . K u r t  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  
d i d  n o t  j e t  h u r t . "
1 1 . S T O R Y  2 / 2 /  1 /  1
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  W a d e  w h o  w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  W a d e  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  W a d e  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  W a d e  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l . W a d e  t h r e w  t h e  
b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  d i d  n o t  g e t  h u r t . "
1 2 .  S T O R Y  2 /  1 /  1 /  1
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  J o h n  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  J o h n  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  J o h n  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  J o h n  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l . J o h n  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  
T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  d i d  n o t  g e t  h u r t . "
1 3 .  S T O R Y  2 / 1 / 1 / 2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  T e d  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  T e d  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  T e d  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  T e d  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l . T e d  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  
T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  l e g  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l  b r u i s e . "
1 4 .  S T O R Y  2 / 1 / 1 / 3
" On c e t h e r e wa s a b a d b o y n a m e d P h i 1 i p w h o  w a s 8 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e d a y  P h i 1 i p a n d  a f r i e n d w e r e p l a y i n g i n t h e p a r k .  P h i 1 i p f o u n d  a n
o 1 d b a s e b a 1 1 . P h i 1 i P w a n t e d t o h i t a t r e e w i t h t h e  b a l l . Ph i l i p  t h r e w
t h e b a l l . T h e b a l l h i t h i s f r i e n d  i n t h e f a c e  a nd g a v e  h i m a b l o o d y
nose."
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1 5 .  S T O R Y  2 /  1 / 2  /  3
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  S o b  w h o  w a s '  8 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  Bo b  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n '  t h e  p a r k .  8 o b  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  B o b  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d .  Bo b  
t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a 
b l o o d y  n o s e . "
1 6 .  S T O R Y  2 / 1 / 3 / 2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  C a r l  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  C a r l  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  C a r l  f o u n d  a n  o l d
b a s e b a l l .  C a r l  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o m e o n e .  C a r l
t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  l e g  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a
s m a l l b r u i s e " .
1 7 .  S T O R Y  2 /  1 / 3 / 3
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  S t e v e  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  S t e v e  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  S t e v e  f o u n d  a n  
o l d  b a s e b a l l .  S t e v e  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o me  o n e .  
S t e v e  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  a n d  g a v e  h i m
a b l o o d y  n o s e " .
1 8 .  S T O R Y  2 /  1 /  3 /  1
11 O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  A l l a n -  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  A l l a n  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  A l l a n  f o u n d  an  
o l d  b a s e b a l l .  A l l a n  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o me  o n e .  
A l l a n  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i a  f r i e n d  d i d  n o t
g e t  h u r t . " .
1 9 .  S T O R Y  2 /  1 / 2 / 2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  G r e g g  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  G r e g g  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  G r e g g  f o u n d  a n
o l d  b a s e b a l l .  G r e g g  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  
a l i t t l e  b i t . G r e g g  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t h i s  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  l e g  
a n d  g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l  b r u i s e . " .
2 0 .  S T O R Y  2 /  I 1 1 1  I
1 " O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  J o e  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  J o e  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  J o e  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  J o e  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l ' a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  a 
l i t t l e  b i t . J o e  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  
d i d  n o t  g e l  h u r t ” .
2 I . S T O R Y  2 / 2 / 3 /  1
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  M i k e  w h o  w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  M i k e  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  M i k e  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  M i k e  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o m e o n e . M i k e  
t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  d i d  n o t  g e t  
hurt".
90
2 2  . S T O R Y  1 /  1 /  1 / 2
(I O n c e t h e r e w a s  a g o o d b o y n a me  d Ra 1 p h w h o w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d
O n e d a y  R a 1 p h a n d a f r i e n d  we r e  p 1 a y i n g i n t h e p a r k . R a l p h f o u n d  a n
o 1 d b a s e b a 1 1 . R a l p h w a n t e d  t o h i t a t r e e  w i t h t h e b a 1 1 .  R a l p h  t h r e w
t h e b a l l . T h e  b a 1 1 h i t h i s  f r i e n d on t h e  1 eg a n d g a v e h i m  a s ma  1 1
bruise".
2 3 .  S T O R Y  1 / 1 /1 / 3
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  G a r y  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  G a r y  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  G a r y  f o u n d  a n  o l d
b a s e b a l l .  G a r y  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l .  G a r y  t h r e w  t h e
b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a b l o o d y  n o s e " .
2 4 . S T O R Y  1 /  1 /  2 /  1
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  H a n k  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  H a n k  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  H a n k  f o u n d  a n  o l d
b a s e b a l l .  H a n k  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  a 
I i t t l e _ b i  t . H a n k  t h r e w  t h e  ba.  I I . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  
d i d  n o l  g e t  h u r t " .  *
2 5  . S T O R Y  1 /  1 / 3 / 1
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d A r n o l d  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  A r n o l d  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  A r n o l d  f o u n d  a n  
o l d  b a s e b a l l .  A r n o l d  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o m e o n e .  
A r n o f d  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  d i d  n o t  
g e t  h u r t . "
2 6 .  S T O R Y  1 /  1 /  2 /  2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  D a v i d  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  D a v i d  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  D a v i d  f o u n d  a n  
o l d  b a s e b a l l .  D a v i d  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  
a l i t t l e  b i t .  D a v i d  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  
l e g  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l b r u i s e . "
2 7 .  S T O R Y  1 / 1 /  3 /  2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  P a u l  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  P a u l  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  P a u l  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a ’ I I .  P a u l  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o m e o n e .  P a u l  
t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  l e g  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a 
s m a l l  b r u i s e . "
2 8 .  S T O R Y  1 /  1 /  2 /  3
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  B i l l  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  B i l l  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  B i l l  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  B i l l  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  . h i s  f r i e n d  a 
l i t t l e '  b i t .  B i l l  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  
a n d  g a v e  h i m  a b l o o d y  n o s e . "
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2 9 .  S T O R Y  1 / 1 / 3 / 3
II O n c e  t h e r e  w a s a g o o d b o y n a me  d K e v i n w h o wa  s 8 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e d a y  K e v i n  a n d  a f r i e n d we r e p 1 a y i n g i n t h e p a r k . Ke  v i n  f o u n d  a n
o 1 d b a s e b a 1 1 .  K e v i n wa  s f e e 1 i n g a n g r y a n d f e l t 1 i k e h u r t i n g s o me  o n e .
K e v i n t h r e w t h e  b a l l T h e b a 1 1 h i t h i s  f r i e n d i n t h e f a c e a n d  g a v e  h i m
a b l o o d y  n o s e . "
3 0 .  S T O R Y  1 / 2 / 3 / 1
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  M i t c h  w h o  w a s  12  y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  M i t c h  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  M i t c h  f o u n d  a n  
o l d  b a s e b a l l .  M i t c h  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  
s o m e o n e .  M i t c h  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  
d i d  n o t  g e t  h u r t . "
3 1 .  S T O R Y  1 / 2 / 2 Z 3
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  . J a c k  w h o  w a s  12  y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  J a c k  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  J a c k  f o u n d  a n  o l d
b a s e b a l l .  J a c k  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  
a l i t t l e  b i t .  J a c k  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  
f a c e  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a b l o o d y  n o s e . "
3 2 .  S T O R Y  1 / 2 / 1 / 3
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  M a r k  w h o  w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  M a r k  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  M a r k  f o u n d  a n  o l d
b a s e b a l l .  M a r k  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l .  M a r k  t h r e w  t h e
b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a b l o o d y  n o s e . '
3 3 .  S T O R Y  1 / 2 / 1 / 2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  K e n  w h o  w a s  12  y e a r s  o l d .
O n e  d a y  K e n  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  K e n  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  K e n  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l .  K e n  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l  
T h e b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  o n  t h e  l e g  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l  b r u i s e . "
3 4  . S T O R Y  2 /  2 /  2 /  3
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  D o u g  w h o  w a s  1 2  y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  D o u g  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  D o u g  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  D o u g  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  a 
l i t t l e  b i t .  D o u g  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  
a n d g a v e h i m a b l o o d y n o s e . "
3 5 .  S T O R Y  2 / 2 / 1 / 3
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  M a c k  w h o  
O n e  d a y  M a c k  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k ,  
b a s e b a l l .  M a c k  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l ,  
b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  a n d  g a v e
w a s  12  y e a r s  o l d .  
M a c k  f o u n d  a n  o l i  
M a c k  t h r e w  t h e  
h i m  a b l o o d y  n o s e
3 6 .  S T O R Y  2 / 2 /  1 / 2
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  F r a n k  w h o  w a s  12 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  F r a n k  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  F r a n k  f o u n d  an  
o l d  b a s e b a l l .  F r a n k  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l .  F r a n k  t h r e w  
t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  on t h e  l e g  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a s m a l l  
bruise."
a..
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A p p e n d i x  C
S t a n d a r d  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  a n c h o r  s t o r i e s ,  a n d  s t o r y  e x a m p l e s
T o d a y  we  a r e  g o i n g  t o  p l a y  a g a m e  t o  s e e  h o w  w e l l  y o u  r e m e m b e r  
s t o r i e s .  I w i l l  r e a d  y o u  s o m e  s t o r i e s  a b o u t  a b o y  p l a y i n g  i n  a p a r k  a n d  
t h e n  a s k  y o u  s o m e  q u e s t  i o n s  . a b o u t  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  i n  t h e  s t o r y .  A f t e r  y o u  
h a v e  t o l d  me  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  i n  t h e  s t o r y  I w a n t  y o u  t o  s h o w  me  h o w  m u c h  
t h e  b o y  i n  t h e  s t o r y  s h o u l d  b e  p u n i s h e d  f o r  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  b y  p o i n t i n g  
t o  o n e  o f  t h e  b l o c k s  o n  t h i s  b o a r d  w i t h  t h i s  s t i c k .  H e r e  i s  a n  e x a m p l e  
o f  a s t o r y  i n  w h i c h  a b o y  g o t  p u n i s h e d  t h i s  m u c h  ( b l o c k  # 9 ) .
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a b a d  b o y  n a m e d  E r i c  w h o  w a s  1 2  y e a r s  o l d .  O n e
d a y  E r i c  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  E r i c  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  E r i c  w a s  f e e l i n g  a n g r y  a n d  f e l t  l i k e  h u r t i n g  s o m e o n e .  E r i c  
t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  a n d  b r o k e  h i s  
nose." •'
A n d  h e r e  i s  a s t o r y  a b o u t  a b o y  w h o  g o t  p u n i s h e d  t h i s  m u c h  ( b l o c k  # 1 3 .
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  T o m  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  O n e
d a y  T o m a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  T o m f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  T o m w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l .  T o m t h r e w  t h e  b a l l .  
T h e  b a l l  j u s t  m i s s e d  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  d i d  n o t  g e t  h u r t . "
N o w  I a m g o i n g  t o  r e a d  y o u  t w o  s a m p l e  s t o r i e s  a n d  a s k  y o u  s o m e  
q u e s t i o n s  t o  s e e  h o w  w e l l  y o u  r e m e m b e r ,  t h e  s t o r i e s :
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  D o u g  w h o  w a a  12  y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  D o u g  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  D o u g  f o u n d  a n  o l d
b a s e b a l l .  D o u g  w a s  f e e l i n g  p l a y f u l  a n d  w a n t e d  t o  s c a r e  h i s  f r i e n d  a
l i t t l e  b i t .  D o u g  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  b u t  h i s  f r i e n d  
d i d  n o t  g e t  h u r t . "
H o w  o l d  i s  D o u g ?  [ 1 2 1
I s  D o u g  n o r m a l l y  a g o o d  o r  b a d  b o y ?  ( g o o d ]
Wh y  d i d  D o u g  t h r o w  t h e  b a l l ?  [ p l a y f u l ]
W h a t  h a p p e n e d  w h e n  D o u g  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l ?  C h i t / n o  h u r t ]
N o w  s h o w  me h o w  m u c h  D o u g  s h o u l d  b e  p u n i s h e d
V e r y  g o o d  n o w  h e r e  i s  t h e  s e c o n d  s t o r y :
" O n c e  t h e r e  w a s  a g o o d  b o y  n a m e d  F r a n k  w h o  w a s  8 y e a r s  o l d .  
O n e  d a y  F r a n k  a n d  a f r i e n d  w e r e  p l a y i n g  i n  t h e  p a r k .  F r a n k  f o u n d  a n  o l d  
b a s e b a l l .  F r a n k  w a n t e d  t o  h i t  a t r e e  w i t h  t h e  b a l l . F r a n k  t h r e w  t h e  
b a l l . T h e  b a l l  h i t  h i s  f r i e n d  i n  t h e  f a c e  a n d  g a v e  h i m  a b l o o d y  n o s e . "
H o w  o l d  i s  F r a n k ?  [ 8 ]
I s  F r a . n k  u s u a l l y  a g o o d  o r  b a d  b o y ?  [ g o o d ]
Wh y  d i d  F r a n k  t h r o w  t h e  b a l l ?  [ h i t  t r e e ]
W h a t  h a p p e n e d  w h e n  F r a n k  t h r e w  t h e  b a l l ?  C h i t / b l o o d y  n o s e ]
N o w  s h o w  me h o w  m u c h  F r a n k  s h o u l d  b e  p u n i s h e d .
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T a p e
Tape
A p p e n d i x  D
R a n d o m  P r e s e n t a t i o n  O r d e r s  o f  T e s t  S t o r i e s
I
S t o r y  C o d e  
1 . 1 -  1. -  2 -  3
2. 2 - 2-3 - 2
3 .  1 - 2 - 3 - 1
4 .  2 -  2 -  2 -  1
5 . 1 - 2 - 1  -  1
6 .  2 - 1  -  1 - 3
7 .  2 - 2 - 3  -  1
8 . 1 -  1 - 2 - 1
9. 2-2-2-2
1 0 .  1 - 2 -  1 -  3
1 1 .  2 - 2 - 3 - 3  
1 2  2 -  1 -  1 -  1
1 3 .  1 - 2 - 3 - 2
1 4 .  1 -  1 -  1 - 3
1 5 .  1 -  1 -  1 -  2
1 6 .  1 - 2 - 2 . - 1
1 7 .  2 - 2 - 1  -  1
1 8 .  2 - 1  -  3 - 2
S t o r y  C o d e
1 9 .  2 - 2 -  1 -  3
2 0 .  2 -  1 -  2 -  3
2 1 .  1 - 2 - 3 - 3
2 2 .  1 - 2 - 3 - 3
2 3  . 1 -  1 - 2 - 2
2 4  . 1 -  1 - 3 - 1
2 5 .  2 - 1 - 3 - 1
2 6  . 2 - 1 - 2 - 1
2 7 .  1 - 2 - 2 - 3
2 8  . 1 -  1 - 1  -  1
2 9 .  1 - 2  -  2 - 2
3 0 .  2 - 1  -  1 - 2  
3 1 .  1 -  1 - 3 - 2
3 2 .  2 - 2 - 2 - 3
3 3 .  2 -  1 - 3  -  3
3 4 .  1 - 1  -  3 -  3
3 5 . '  2  -  1 - 2 - 2
3 6 .  2 - 2 - 1 - 2
I I
S t o r y  C o d e  S t o r y  C o d e
1 .  2 - 1 - 3 - 1  1 9 .  1 - 1 - 2 - 1
2 .  2 -  1 -  1 - 3  2 0 .  1 -  1 -  1 - 3
3 . 1 - 1 - 2 - 2  2 1 . 2 - 1 - 2 - 1
4 1 -  1 - 2 -  3 2 2 .  2 -  1 -  2 - 2
5 .  2 - 1 - 3 - 3  2 3 .  1 - 2 - 2 - 2
6 .  2 - 2 - 1  - 2  2 4 .  2 - 2  -  3 -  2
7 .  2 -  1 - 2 - 3  2 5 .  1 - 2 - 3 - 3
8 .  { — 1 — 1 -  1 2 6 .  ^ - 2 - 3 - 2
9 .  1 - 2 - 3 - 1  2 7 .  2 -  2 -  2 -  3
1 0 .  2 -  1 - 3 - 2  2 8 .  1 - 1 - 3 - 1
1 1 .  1 - 2 -  1 - 3  2 9 .  1 - 1  - 3 - 3
1 2 .  2 -  2 -  3 -  1 3 0 .  2 - 2 - 1  -  3
1 3 .  1 - 2 - 1 - 1  3 1 .  1 — 2 — 2 — 1
1 4 .  2 — 1 -  1 — 2  3 2 .  2 - 2 - 2 - 2
1 5 .  1 -  2 -  2 -  3 3 3 .  2 -  2 -  1 -  1
1 6 .  1 -  2 -  1 - 2  3 4 .  2 - 2 - 2  -  1
1 7 .  1 -  1 -  1 -  2 3 5 .  2 -  2 -  3 -  3
1 8 .  1 -  1 -  3 -  2 - 3 6 .  2 -  1 -  1 -  1
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Tape III
1 .
S t o r y  C o d e  
1 -  1 - 2 - 2 1 9 .
S t o r y  C o d e  
2 - 2 - 3 - 1
2 . 2 -  1 - 3 -  1 2 0  . 1 -  1 - 3 - 3
3 . 2 - 1  -  1 -  1 2 1 . 1 -  2 -  1 -  2
4 . 2 - 1 - 3 - 3 2 2  . 1 -  1 - 3 - 1
5 . 2 - 2 - 2 -  1 2 3  . 2 - 1 - 2 - 2
6 . 2 - 2 - 1 - 3 2 4  . 1 -  1 - 2 - 1
7 . 1 - 2 - 2 - 2 2 5  . 2 - 2 - 2 - 2
8 . 1 -  1 -  1 - 3 2 6  . 2 - 2 - 3  - 2
9 . 2 - 1 - 3 - 2 2 7  . 1 -  1 -  1 - 2
1 0  . 1 -  2 -  3 -  2 2 8  . 2 -  2 -  3 -  3
1 1 . 1 -  1 - 2 - 3 2 9  . 2 -  1 - 2 - 3
1 2 . 1 -  2 -  3 -  1 3 0  . 2 -  1 -  1 -  2
1 3 . 1 - 2 - 1 - 1 3 1 . 2 -  1 - 2 - 1
1 4 . 2 - 2 -  1 -  1 3 2  . 2 - 2 - 2 - 3
1 5 . 1 -  1 - 3 - 2 3 3  . 1 - 2 - 2 - 3
1 6 . 2 - 2 - 1 - 2 3 4  . 1 - 2 - 1 - 3
1 7 . 1 - 2 - 2 -  1 3 5  . 1 -  1 -  1 -  1
1 8 . 2 - 1  -  1 - 3 3 6  . 1 - 2 - 3 - 3
T a p e  I V  
1 .
S t o r y  C o d e  
1 -  1 -  1 -  1 1 9 .
S t o r y  C o d e  
2 -  1 - 2 - 2
2 . 1 - 2 - 1  -  1 2 0  . 2 -  1 - 2 - 1
3 . 1 - 2 - 2 -  1 2 1 . 2 -  2 -  3 -  1
4 . 1 - 2 - 2 - 2 2 2  . 1 -  1 -  1 - 2
5 . 1 - 2 - 3 - 2 2 3  . 1 -  1 -  1 - 3
6 . 1 - 2 - 3 - 3 2 4  . 1 -  1 -  2 -  1
7 . 2 -  2 -  3 -  3 2 5  . 1 - 1 - 3 - 1
8 . 2 -  2 -  3 -  2 2 6  . 1 -  1 - 2 - 2
9 . 2 -  2 -  2 -  2 2 7  . 1 -  1 - 3 - 2
1 0 . 2 - 2 - 2 - 1 2 8  . 1 -  1 - 2 - 3
1 1 . 2 - 2 - 1  -  1 2 9  . 1 -  1 - 3 - 3
1 2  . 2 - 1  -  1 -  1 3 0  . 1 - 2 - 3 -  1
1 3 . 2 - 1  -  1 - 2 3 1 . 1 - 2 - 2 - 3
1 4 . 2 - 1  -  1 - 3 3 2  . 1 - 2 - 1 - 3
( 1 5 . 2 - 1 - 2 - 3 3 3  . 1 - 2 -  1 - 2
1 6 . 2 -  1 - 3 - 2 3 4 . 2 -  2 -  2 -  3
1 7 . 2 - 1 - 3 - 3 3 5  . 2 - 2 -  1 - 3
1 8 . 2 - 1 - 3 -  1 3 6  . 2 - 2 - 1 - 2
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